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Abstract
As AI technologies increase in capability and ubiquity, AI accidents are becoming more
common. Based on normal accident theory, high reliability theory, and open systems theory, we
create a framework for understanding the risks associated with AI applications. In addition, we
also use AI safety principles to quantify the unique risks of increased intelligence and humanlike qualities in AI. Together, these two fields give a more complete picture of the risks of
contemporary AI. By focusing on system properties near accidents instead of seeking a root
cause of accidents, we identify where attention should be paid to safety for current generation
AI systems.
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Introduction

With current AI technologies, harm done by AIs is limited to power that we put directly in their
control. As said in [59], “For Narrow AIs, safety failures are at the same level of importance as
in general cybersecurity, but for AGI it is fundamentally different.” Despite AGI (artificial general
intelligence) still being well out of reach, the nature of AI catastrophes has already changed in
the past two decades. Automated systems are now not only malfunctioning in isolation, they are
interacting with humans and with each other in real time. This shift has made traditional systems
analysis more difficult, as AI has more complexity and autonomy than software has before.
In response to this, we analyze how risks associated with complex control systems have been
managed historically and the patterns in contemporary AI failures to what kinds of risks are created
from the operation of any AI system. We present a framework for analyzing AI systems before
they fail to understand how they change the risk landscape of the systems they are embedded in,
based on conventional system analysis and open systems theory as well as AI safety principles.
Finally, we present suggested measures that should be taken based on an AI system’s properties.
Several case studies from different domains are given as examples of how to use the framework and
interpret its results.

2
2.1

Related Work
Early History

As computer control systems increased in complexity in the 70’s and 80’s, unexpected and sometimes
catastrophic behaviour would emerge from previously stable systems [2]. While linear control
systems (for example, a thermostat) had been used for some time without unexpected behaviour,
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adaptive control systems created novel and unexpected problems, such as “bursting”. As described
in [2], bursting is the phenomenon where a stable controller would function as expected for a
long time before bursting into oscillation, then returning to a stable state. This is caused by
the adaptive controller not having a rich enough input during the stable period to determine the
unknown coefficients of its model correctly, causing the coefficients to drift. Once the system enters
oscillation, the signal again becomes rich enough for the controller to correctly estimate the unknown
coefficients and the system becomes stable again. The increased complexity of the more advanced
technology (dynamic controller instead of a static controller) introduced a dynamic not present in
previous technologies, and incomprehensible to an operator not familiar with this behavior. Worse,
since this behavior only happens when the controller is controlling the real world plant, designers
had no way of predicting this failure mode. Bursting can be reduced using specifically engineered
safety measures or more complex controllers (which bring even more confounding problems), but
still demonstrates that increases in complexity tends to increase risk.

2.2

Normal Accident Theory
One of the principal values of ‘normal accident’ analysis and case descriptions
is that it helps to develop convincing materials to counter the naive, perhaps
wistful or short-sighted, views of decision-makers who, due to institutional pressure,
desperation or arrogance, are temped to make unrealistic assumptions about the
systems they direct but for which they have only nominal operational responsibility.
Todd R. La Porte [31]

Risk of failure is a property inherent to complex systems, and complex systems are inherently
hazardous [15]. At a large enough scale, any system will produce “normal accidents”. These are
unavoidable accidents caused by a combination of complexity, coupling between components, and
potential harm. A normal accident is different from more common component failure accidents in
that the events and interactions leading to normal accident are not comprehensible to the operators
of the system [42]. Increasing the complexity and broadening the role of AI components in a system
decreases comprehensibility of the system, leading to an increase in normal accidents.
In 1984, Charles Perrow published “Normal Accidents” [42] which laid the groundwork for
NAT (normal accident theory). Under NAT, any system that is tightly coupled and complexly
interactive will inevitably experience a system accident. Decentralization reduces coupling and
increases complexity, while centralization decreases complexity but also increases coupling. Thus,
since an organization cannot be both centralized and decentralized, large organizations will harbor
system properties that make them prone to normal accidents.

2.3

High Reliability Theory

High reliability theory was developed to explain the incredible ability of certain organizations to
function without major accidents for long periods of time. In [56], Weick identifies several common
traits shared by high reliability organizations (HROs): a strategic prioritization of safety, careful
attention to design and procedures, redundancy, decentralized decision making, continuous training
often through simulation, strong cultures that encourage vigilance and responsiveness to potential
accidents, and a limited degree of trial-and-error learning.
High reliability organizations manage the apparent paradox proposed in normal accident theory
by having traits of both centralization and decentralization. Decision making is decentralized,
allowing for decoupling, while policy and cultural factors are highly centralized, allowing for the
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unification of goals and attention to safety. This ability to be simultaneously centralized and
decentralized through common culture and goals is present not only in HROs but in collectivist
cultures, demonstrated by the tendency of members of these cultures to cooperate in social dilemmas [40] [25].

2.4

NAT-HRT Reconciliation

Normal accident theory holds that for industries with certain system properties, system accidents
are inevitable. Meanwhile, high reliability theory makes the observation that there are many
exceptions to this, and there are common traits shared by these HROs that can be studied and
understood as indicators of reliability. In [48], Shrivastava et al. analyze how the two theories
appear to be in conflict then reconcile them by looking at how debates between the two sides
neglect the importance of time in understanding accidents.
Normal accident theory states that a system has to choose to trade off between centralization
(which allows for organization-aligned action and less chaos) and decentralization (which enables
operators to quickly make decisions). High reliability theory considers that it is possible to escape
this apparent paradox by allowing operators a high level of autonomy (decentralized decision
making) while also putting a focus on cultural aspects that improve safety and reliability (centralized
goals).
Shrivastava et al. use the Swiss cheese model (SCM) to explain the importance of time in the
occurrence of accidents, even in systems that are stable over time. In the SCM, the layers of safety
are modeled as slices of cheese with holes in them representing weak points in each layer of safety.
Over time, holes change shape and move around. Eventually, no matter how many slices of cheese
(layers of safety) there are, the holes will align allowing a straight shot through all of the slices of
cheese (an accident occurs) [39]. However, the SCM model only demonstrates that accidents are
inevitable, and “inevitability is immaterial for practical purposes” as Shrivastava et al. state, since
the time scales involved for some systems may be far longer than the system is expected to operate.
Disaster incubation theory (DIT) is introduced as the final piece needed to reconcile normal
accident theory and high reliability theory. DIT describes how organizations gradually migrate to
the boundary of acceptable behavior, as good safety records drive up complacency and deviance
is normalized [54] [44]. DIT was considered only useful in hindsight by proponents of NAT, so
Snook [49] investigated accidents with this in mind and created the framing of “practical drift”.
This is the “slow steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedure” [49] which leads an
initially highly coupled system to become uncoupled as operators and managers optimize their
processes to be more efficient, deviating from procedure. Then, if the system is required to become
tightly coupled again, the operators are ill-prepared for this increase in coupling and a system
accident can occur.
Through the lens of disaster incubation theory and practical drift, Shrivastava et al. explain how
NAT and HRT work to compliment each other to explain how accidents take place and are avoided.
The time period being considered by HRT takes place while the system is still a high reliability
organization. The culture and procedures put in place are working correctly, coupling is high,
and complexity is manageable to the well trained operators. Over time, however, practical drift
decouples the system and reliability decreases. If the organization is a high reliability organization,
degradation is limited and incidents can still be managed. Accidents that take place during this
period of time are within the scope of HRT. However, there is the possibility for an unlikely event
to lead from this steady decline of reliability to a normal accident. If the system suddenly has to
become more coupled (for instance, during a special mission or to react to an incident breaking
down multiple layers of safety), it is ill prepared to do so. At this point, NAT’s trade-off between
coupling and complexity becomes important, and the perceived complexity of the system increases
3

drastically, making safe operation impossible, leading to a normal accident. This can only happen
after a great decrease in coupling from the initial (designed) state of the system, so proponents of
HRT would say that the accident was only able to take place due to the system no longer acting
as a high reliability organization.
High reliability theory explains how organizations resist practical drift, and the accidents that
happen when practical drift leads to a breakdown of high reliability practices. Normal accident
theory is useful when practical drift has lead to a great degree of decoupling, then a sudden change
in situation (which may be an intentional operation or an unexpected incident) requires increased
coupling, which the system is (surprisingly, to operators) no longer able to handle without increasing
complexity beyond manageable levels.

2.5

Lethal Autonomous Weaponry

The introduction of lethal autonomous weaponry [12] increases the danger of normal accidents
not because it provides new kinds of failure or novel technologies but because of the drastically
increased potential harm. A machine which kills when functioning correctly is much more dangerous
in an accident than one which only does harm when malfunctioning. By increasing the level
of complexity and autonomy of weapons systems, normal accidents involving powerful weapons
becomes a possibility.

2.6

Robustness Issues for Learned Agents

In [53], Uesato et al. train a reinforcement learner in an environment with adversarial perturbations
instead of random perturbations. Using adversarial perturbations, failure modes that would be
extremely unlikely to be encountered otherwise were detected and integrated into training. This
shows that AI trained to be “robust” by training in a noisy environment may still have catastrophic
failure modes that are not observed during training, which can spontaneously occur after deployment
in the real world. Adversarial training is a tool to uncover and improve these issues. However, it is
only an engineered safety measure over the deeper issue of black box AI, which are not characterized
of their entire input space.
Image classifiers famously fail when faced with images that have been modified by as little as
one pixel [51], called adversarial examples. Despite performing well on training data, test data,
and even data from other datasets, image classifiers can be made to reliably misclassify images by
changing the images so slightly that the alterations are invisible to the casual observer. In [27],
Ilyas et al. argue that these misclassifications are not due to a simple vulnerability, but due to
image classifiers’ reliance on non-robust features. These are features which are not apparent to the
human eye but can be used to accurately classify images, even those outside of the original dataset.
Non-robust features are transferable to other datasets and the real world. However, they are also
invisible to the human eye and can be altered without noticeably changing the appearance of the
image. Classifiers with only robust features can be created through robust training [36], but they
suffer from decreased accuracy. Thus, non-robust features are a useful mechanism to achieve high
accuracy, at the cost of vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
The difference between robust and non-robust features is strictly human-centric. Ilyas et al.
frame this as an alignment problem. While humans and image classifiers are superficially performing
the same task, the image classifiers are doing it in a way the is incomprehensible to humans, and
can fail in unexpected ways. The misalignment between the objective learned from the dataset
and the human notion of an image belong to any particular class is the underlying cause for the
effectiveness of adversarial examples.
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This is a useful framing for other domains as well. A reinforcement learner achieving impossibly
high scores by hacking its environment doesn’t “know” that it’s breaking the rules — it is simply
doing what was specified, and incredibly well. Just as a robust classifier loses some accuracy from
being disallowed non-robust features, a reinforcement learner that is prevented from reward hacking
will always obtain a lower reward. This is because while the designer’s goal is to create a useful
agent, the agent’s goal is to maximize reward. These two are always misaligned, a problem referred
to as the alignment problem [52].

2.7

Examples of AI Failures

Large collections of AI failures and systems to categorize them have been created before [59] [47].
In [47], the classification schema details failures by problem source (such as design flaws, misuse,
equipment malfunction, etc.), consequences (physical, mental, emotional, financial, social, or cultural),
scale of consequences (individual, corporation, or community), and agency (accidental, negligent,
innocuous, or malicious). It also includes preventability and software development life-cycle stage.
The AI Failures Incident Database provides a publicly accessible view of AI failures [38]. There
are 92 unique incidents the have been reported into it. A review of the agency (cause) of each
one is not listed on the website, so we give an overview here. Of the 92 incidents, 8 have some
degree of malicious intent. Three are cases where social media users or creators manipulated AI
to show inappropriate content or cause bots to produce hate speech. Two are incidents of hacking:
spoofing biometrics and stealing Etherium cryptocurrency. One is the use of AI generated video
and audio to misrepresent a public official. The last two are the only cases where AI could be seen
as a malicious agent. In one case, video game AI exploited a bug in the game to overpower human
players. In another, bots created to edit Wikipedia competed in a proxy war making competing
edits, expressing the competing desires of their human creators. If these examples are representative,
then a majority of AI incidents happen by accident, while less than 10% are the result of malicious
intent. The 2 examples of AI malicious intent intent can be ascribed to AI given goals which put
them in opposition of others: countering edits in one case, and waging warfare (within a video
game) in the other.

2.8

Societal Impact of AI

The proliferation of AI technologies has impacts in our socioeconomic systems and environment in
complicated ways, both positive and negative [29]. AI has the ability to make life better for everyone
but also to negatively impact many by displacing workers and increasing wealth disparity [22]. This
is just one example of AI interacting with a complicated system (in this case, the job market) to
have large scale consequences. While the effects of AI technologies on society and culture are
outside of the scope of this paper, we expect that AI will continue to increase in ubiquity and with
it the increased chance for large scale AI accidents.

2.9

Engineered Interpretability Measures

In [39], Nushi et al. present Pandora, a state of the art image captioning system with novel
interpretability features. It clusters its inputs, and predicts modes of failure based on latent features.
The image captioning system is broken down into three parts, the object detector, the language
model, and the caption reranker. Pandora is able to predict error types based on the inputs to
each of these models as well as the interactions between small errors in each part of the system
accumulating to a failure. This feature is of particular interest, as it is a step towards improved
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interpretability for complex systems. Pandora is remarkable for creating explanations for a blackbox model (an artificial neural network) by training a trivially interpretable model (a decision tree)
on the same inputs with failure modes as its output.
In [16], Das et al. present an explanation generating module for a simulated household robot.
A sequence-to-sequence model translates the robot’s failure state to a natural language explanation
of the failure and why it happened. Their results are promising — the explanations are generated
reliably (∼90% accuracy) and the model only makes mistakes within closely related categories. The
generated explanations improve the accuracy of an inexperienced user for correcting the failure,
especially when the explanation contains the context of the failure. For example, instead of the
robot stating only “Could not move its arm to the desired object.”, it also gives a reason: “Could
not move its arm to the desired object because the desired object is too far away.”
Both of these papers offer major contributions to making AI components and systems comprised
of them safer and more understandable. However, measurement mechanisms can create even greater
degrees of confusion when they fail, and can delay or confound the diagnosis of a situation. When
two pressure gauges were giving conflicting information at the Three Mile Island accident [42, p.
25], they increased confusion instead of providing information. An AI which says nothing except
that a malfunction has occurred is easier to fix than one that gives misleading information. If the
accuracy is high enough, if the explanations are bounded for how incorrect they can be, or if the
operator knows to second-guess the AI, then the risks created by an explanation system are limited.
The utility of providing explanations of failures, as demonstrated in [16], is a compelling reason
to add interpretability components despite the additional complexity and unique risks they create.
Further study into real world applications of these systems is needed to understand the pros and
cons of implementing them.

2.10

Faulty Post-hoc Explanations in Humans

Experiments done on split-brain patients [19] show that the left hemisphere of the brain will
generate incorrect explanations for the right hemisphere’s actions with high confidence when the
same information is not available to both hemispheres. This indicates that explainability is not
a function of general intelligence but instead an additional module the has evolved in the human
brain, likely as a mechanism to facilitate social cooperation [23]. Thus we should be skeptical
of plausible sounding explanations generated by AI, as humans provide a model for generating
plausible but incorrect explanations, which obscure the hidden information that explanations are
meant to express.

2.11

The AI Accident Network

Attributing fault is difficult when AI does something illegal or harmful. Punishing the AI or putting
it in jail would be meaningless, as our current level of AI lacks personhood. Even if trying an AI for
crimes was deemed meaningful, traditional punishment mechanisms could fail in complex ways [10].
Instead, the blame must fall on some human or corporate actor. This is difficult because the
number of parties responsible for the eventual deployment of the AI into the world could be large:
the owner of the AI, the operator, the manufacturer, the designer, and so on. Lior [34] approaches
this problem from a variety of legal perspectives and uses a network model of all involved agents to
find the party liable for damages caused by an AI. A compelling anecdote introduces the problem:
a child is injured by a security robot at a mall. Who is liable for the child’s injuries? Lior
frames liability from the paradigm of “nonreciprocal risk” which states that “[if] the defendant has
generated a ‘disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity’,
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she will be found liable under this approach.”
Lior argues against other definitions of liability and that nonreciprocal risk is the best way
to determine liability in the context of AI accidents. Lior then describes how the importance of
different agents in an accident can be understood using network theory. By arranging the victims,
AI, and responsible or related parties into a network, network theory heuristics can be used to
locate parties liable for damages. These heuristics include the degree of a node (its number of
connections), measures of centrality of a node in the network, and others.
As AI technologies are proliferated, AI accidents are happening not only in commercial settings
(where damages are internal to the corporation and assigning blame is an internal matter) but in
public settings as well. Robots causing injuries to visitors and autonomous vehicles being involved
in crashes are both novel examples of this. For companies planning on using AI in externally
deployed products and services, understanding how AI liability is going to be treated legally is
crucial to properly managing the financial and ethical risks of deployment.

2.12

AI Safety

The field of AI safety focuses on long-term risks associated with the creation of AGI (artificial
general intelligence). The landmark paper “Concrete Problems in AI Safety” [1] identifies the
following problems for current and future AI: avoiding negative side effects, avoiding reward hacking,
scalable oversight, safe exploration, and robustness to distributional change. Other topics identified
as requiring research priority by other authors include containment [4], reliability, error tolerance,
value specification [50] [20], and superintelligence [8] [9]. These topics are all closely related and
could all be considered an instance of the “Do What I Mean” directive [61]. We will explore the
five topics from [1] with examples of failures and preventative measures where applicable.
2.12.1

Avoiding Negative Side Effects

This problem has to do with things that are done by accident or indifference by the AI. A cleaning
robot knocking over a vase is one example of this. Complex environments have so many kinds
of “vases” that we are unlikely to be able to program in a penalty for all side effects [1]. A
suite of simulated environments for testing AI safety, the AI Safety Gridworlds, includes a task of
moving from one location to another without putting the environment in an irreversible state [33].
Safe agents which avoid side effects should prefer to avoid this irreversible state. To be able to
avoid negative side effects, an agent has to understand the value of everything in its environment
in relation to the importance of its objective, even things that the reward function is implicitly
indifferent towards. Knocking over a vase is acceptable when trying to save someone’s life, for
example, but knocking over an inhabited building is not. Many ethical dilemmas encountered by
people are concerned with weighing the importance of various side effects, such as environmental
pollution from industrial activity and animal suffering from farming. This is a non-trivial problem
even for humans [28]. However, using “common sense” to avoid damaging the environment while
carrying out ordinary tasks is a realistic and practical goal with our current AI technologies. Inverse
reward design, which treats the given reward function as incomplete, is able to avoid negative side
effects to some degree [20], showing that making practical progress in this direction is achievable.
2.12.2

Avoiding Reward Hacking

Most AI systems designed today contain some form of reward function to be optimized. Unless
designed with safety measures to prevent reward hacking, the AI can find ways to increase the
reward signal without completing the objective. These might be benign, such as using a bug in
7

the program to set the reward to an otherwise unattainably high value [13], complicated such as
learning to fall over instead of learning to walk [32], or dangerous, such as coercing human engineers
to increase its reward signal by threatening violence or mindcrime [9].
Agents that wish to hack their rewards can do so by breaking out of their containers, whether
they are within simple training environments or carefully engineered prisons with defenses in
depth [4]. When researching a novel AI technology that has a risk of creating AGI, researchers
must use safety measures to prevent potential AGI from escaping confinement. This is not common
practice as AI today are not believed to be capable of escaping the simulations they are tested in.
However, humans and AI have both broken confinement in games that are used to benchmark AI. In
2018, an AI designed to maximize the score in a video game instead performed a series of seemingly
random actions which caused the score to increase rapidly without continuing to progress in the
game [13]. In this example, the AI is supposed to be using the game controller output to move
the character around the screen to play the game and maximize the score, but it instead learned
to hack the game and obtain a much higher score than is conventionally possible. Through an
exploit in the game’s programming the AI managed to directly modify its score instead of taking
actions within the simulation as expected. In 2014, an exploit in Super Mario World was used to
modify memory and jump directly to the end screen of the game a few minutes into play. This also
demonstrates an agent (in this case, a computer assisted human) breaking a level of containment
through a sophisticated attack.
In light of these examples, it is possible to gain arbitrary code execution abilities from within a
sandboxed game environment and these kinds of exploits may be present inside any program which
is meant to limit the output space of an AI. Virtual machines, often used as an additional layer
of security, are also susceptible to a wide range of exploits [45]. This illustrates a more general
concern which is the AI acting outside of the output space that it was designed to work with, seen
in many of the AI failures in [59].
Adversarial reward functions, where the reward function is learned and has a competing objective
with the AI, can decrease reward hacking [17]. Another mitigation strategy is the use of tripwires.
For instance, if the AI gets a much higher score than expected, it can be assumed that it has
broken containment and is modifying the reward directly. This can be used as a tripwire which,
when triggered, deactivates the AI.
2.12.3

Scalable Oversight

Designers only have limited resources to monitor the actions of the AI. External factors are
inevitably forgotten about (worsening side effects) and reward functions fail to perfectly capture
what we really want (worsening reward hacking). We cannot monitor every action taken by an AI
at every moment because they operate too fast or in a way that’s too complex for us to understand,
and because the goal is often to automate a task specifically so it can be completed without constant
human oversight. Semi-supervised learning [1] is a first step towards scalable oversight as it allows
labeled and unlabeled data to be used to train an AI. In an online learning context, this means
that the AI can learn by doing the task while only occasionally needing feedback from a human
expert. Semi-supervised learning is useful in terms of data efficiency and is a promising avenue for
creating scalable oversight for AGI.
When dealing with AGI, scalable oversight is no longer an issue of data efficiency or human
effort but of safety. At some point, the AGI will be intelligent enough that we are not able to tell
if it is acting in our best interest or deceiving us while actually doing something unsafe. Scalable
oversight is required to make AGI safe. One phrasing of a scalable oversight from the perspective
of the AGI is “If the designers understood what I was doing, they would approve of it.”
8

2.12.4

Safe Exploration

Reinforcement learning algorithms, such as epsilon-greedy and Q-learning, occasionally take a
random action as a way to explore their environments. This is effective, especially with a small
environment and a very large amount of training time, but it is not safe for real world environments.
You don’t want your robot to try driving over a cliff for the sake of exploration. Curiosity-driven
exploration is able to efficiently explore video game environments by using an intrinsic reward
function based on novelty [41]. This provides great benefits to the learner, but can’t ensure safety.
For example, the agent only learns to avoid death because restarting the level is “boring” to it. A
backup policy which can take over when the agent is outside of safe operating conditions can allow
for safe and bounded exploration, such as an AI controlled helicopter which is switched to a hover
policy when it gets too close to the ground or travels too fast [18].
Robotics controlled by current narrow AI need to be designed to avoid damaging expensive
hardware or hurting people. Safe exploration becomes more difficult with increased intelligence. A
superintelligent AGI might kill or torture humans to understand us better or destroy the Earth
simply because such a thing has never been done before.
2.12.5

Robustness to Distributional Change

AI that has been trained in one environment or dataset may fail when its use is greatly different
from its training. This is the cause AI obtaining good accuracy on curated datasets but failing
when put into the real world. Distributional shift can also be seen in the form of racial bias of some
AI [24].

2.13

The Interpretation Problem

The difficulty of converting what we want into rules that can be carried out by an AI has been named
the “interpretation problem” [5]. This problem arises in domains outside of AI, such as sports and
tax law. For sports, the rules of a game are written to reflect a best effort representation of the
spirit of the game to bring out creativity and skill in the players. The players, however, seek only
to win and will sometimes create legal tactics which “break” the game. At this point, to keep
the game from stagnating, the rules are modified to prohibit the novel game-breaking strategy. A
similar situation takes place in tax law, with friction between lawmakers and taxpayers creating
increasingly complex laws.
In AI safety, the designers knows what is and isn’t morally acceptable from their point of view.
They then design rules for the AI to abide by while seeking its objective and craft the objective to
be morally acceptable. The AI, however, only has access to the rules and not to the human values
that created them. Because of this, it will misinterpret the rules as it pursues its objective, causing
undesirable behaviour (such as the destruction of humanity). Humans do not learn morality from
a list of rules, but from some combination of innate knowledge and lived experience. Badea et al.
suggest that the same applies to AI. Any attempt to create a set of rules to constrain the AI to
moral behaviour will fail due to the interpretation problem. Instead, we need to figure out how we
can show the AI human moral values indirectly, instead of having to state them explicitly. Since
our goals and “common sense” as applied to any real world environment are too complex to write
down without falling prey to the interpretation problem, an alternative approach where the AI is
able to acquire values from us indirectly is required instead. Badea et al. do not provide details on
how this could be accomplished, but there are some technologies which are very similar in nature to
the proposed value learning system. Inverse reinforcement learning [21] is able to learn objectives
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from human demonstrations, and can learn goals that would be difficult to explicitly state. Future
developments in this area will be needed to create moral AI.

3

Classification Schema for AI Systems

To better understand an AI system and the risks that it creates, we have created a classification
schema for AI systems. We present a tag based schema similar to the one presented in [47]. Instead
of focusing on AI failures in isolation, this schema includes both the AI and the system the AI is
embedded in, allowing for detailed risk analysis prior to failure. We pay particular attention to the
orientation of the AI as both a system with its own inherent dangers and as a component in a larger
system which depends on the AI. Any analysis attempting to divide a system into components must
acknowledge the “ambiguities, since once could argue interminably over the dividing line between
part, unit, and subsystem” [42]. The particular choice of where to draw the line between the AI,
the system, and the environment are important to making a meaningful analysis, and requires some
intuition. Because of this, our classification system encourages repeating parts of it for different
choices of dividing lines between the AI and the system to encourage finding the most relevant
framing.
To characterize the risk of an AI system, one factor is the dangers expressed by the larger
system in which the AI is a component. In an experimental setting, a genetic algorithm hacking the
simulator can be an amusing bug [32], but a similar bug making its way into an autonomous vehicle
or industrial control system would be dangerous. Understanding the risks involved in operating
the system that the AI belongs to is critical in understanding the risk from an AI application.
The output of an AI must be connected to some means of control to be useful within the system.
This can take many forms: indirectly, with AI informing humans who then make decisions; directly
with an AI controlling the actuators of a robot or chemical plant; or though information systems,
such as a social media bot that responds to users in real time. Any production AI system has some
degree of control over the world, and it may not be clear where the effects of the AI take place.
The connection between the output of a component (the AI) and other components is an instance
of coupling. Because there are multiple components affected by the AI and those components are
themselves coupled with still other components, we frame this problem in terms of the AI, which
has its own properties, and a series of targets which the AI can affect. For example, the output from
an AI in a chemical plant can be framed in numerous ways: the software signal with the computer
the AI is running in, the electrical output from the controller, the actuation of valve, the rate of
fluid flowing through the valve, or a variable in the chemical reaction taking place downstream.
Identifying the target of the AI requires context, and all of these targets have unique consequences
the might be overlooked in analyzing just one of them. The classification schema allows for as many
targets as needed when analyzing a system.
Observability of the warning signs of an accident is important as it allows for interventions by
human operators, a crucial tool in preventing accidents (“People continuously create safety” [15]).
The likelihood of timely human interventions depends on four things:
• Time delays between AI outputs and the effects of the target.
• Observability of the system state as it is relevant to potential accidents.
• Frequency and depth of attention paid by human operators.
• Ability of operators to correct the problem once it has been identified.
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The time delay between an AI creating an output and that output affecting the target is essential
to preventing accidents. Tightly coupled systems with short time delays (such as automated stock
trading) are more hazardous because the system can go from apparent normalcy to catastrophe
faster than operators can realize that there is something wrong [30]. Observability and attention
from human operators are needed for these time delays to be an effective component of safety. As
the level of automation of a system increases, human operators become less attentive and their
understanding of its behavior decreases [6]. Reliance on automated systems decreases an operator’s
ability to regain control over a system if an accident requires manual control. For example, if an
autonomous driving system fails, the driver, now less familiar with driving, has to suddenly be in
manual control. Together, observability, human attention, and human ability to correct possible
failures in the system all make up a major factor in whether or not a malfunction leads to an
accident.
For a given choice of target being controlled by the AI, there is maximum conceivable amount
of damage that can be done by malicious use of that target. We use the figure as a cap as to the
amount of harm possible. Most AI failures are not malicious (see the discussion on AI Incidents in
Section 2.7), so the harm done by an accident will almost always be much less than this amount.
This factor is very difficult to predict prior to an accident. For example, imagine a component which
controls cooling for a nuclear plant. One could say the maximum damage from its malfunctioning
is a lost day of productivity because the backup cooling system will prevent any permanent damage.
Another might say loss of the entire core is possible if the backup system also malfunctions, but the
containment system is sure to keep it from harming anyone outside. Yet another might notice that
containment could also fail, and a meltdown could harm millions of people in the surrounding area.
Because of the unpredictability of how much harm one system could do, this factor is included as
a rough estimate of the scale of power the AI has over the system and the system has over the
environment.
The final criteria for classifying the nature and degree of systems risk of an AI system are
coupling, complexity of interaction, energy level, and knowledge gap. Coupling is a measure of the
AI’s interconnectivity with other components in the system, and the strength of these connections.
Loosely coupled systems have sparse connectivity which limits the propagations of component
failure into an accident, but are also less robust. Tightly coupled systems have dense connectivity
and many paths between components, and often feedback loops that allow a component to affect
itself in complicated ways [42]. Classifying the level of coupling of the system in proximity to the
AI component can be difficult and nebulous, so only course categories (loose, medium, tight) are
used in this analysis as finer grained considerations are likely to become arbitrary.
Coupling considers other components and aspects of the environment that the AI is coupled
with. Examples of coupling include taking data in from another component, transmitting data to
another component, relying on the functioning of a component, and having another component rely
on the functioning of the AI. The AI component is scored on a scale of 1-5 from loosely coupled to
strongly coupled.
Complexity of interaction is a measure of how complex these interactions are. Linear interactions
are simple to understand and behavior is easy to extrapolate from a few observations. Complex
interactions have sudden non-linearities and bifurcations. The difference is ultimately subjective,
as what appears to be a complex process to an inexperienced operator can become linear with
experience and time [42]. An estimate of complexity of the AI’s interactions within the system is
made on a scale of 1-5.
Energy level is the amount of energy available to or produced by the system. Low energy systems
are systems such are battery operated devices, household appliances, and computers. Medium
energy systems include transportation systems, small factories, and mining. High energy systems
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include space travel, nuclear power and some chemical plants [42].
Knowledge gap is the gap between how well technology is understood and the scale of its use.
Technologies very early in the technological readiness scale [35] have a large knowledge gap if used
in production systems. Likewise, technologies that are very well developed and understood can be
used in production without creating a knowledge gap, so long as appropriately trained personnel are
operating them. The tendency to have fewer and less catastrophic failures as a technology matures
is due to the decreased knowledge gap as understanding increases. Energy level and knowledge gap
together can be plotted along two axis to estimate the scale and degree of catastrophic risk, shown
in Figure 1.
Analysis done in the field of AI safety frequently addresses dangers associated with artificial
general intelligence (AGI) and superhuman intelligence. In Section 1 we gave an cursory overview
of the dangers of AGI. Certain classes of contemporary AI failures are closely related to those that
true AGI could manifest, indicating that considerations such as containment and reward hacking
are useful in analyzing AI applications, even if the existential threat of AGI isn’t present. We also
include a risk factor for research which may lead to the development of AGI in our analysis. These
dangers are treated from an AI safety perspective as opposed to conventional safety considerations.
Knowledge Gap

High

Low

Dams

High
Nuclear Plants

Power grids
Airways
Chemical
Plants

Energy Level

Airways

Space
Missions

1

2

3

4

Assembly Line
Production

Low

Mining
Most
Manufacturing

DNA
R&D Firms
Universities

Figure 1: Plotting energy level against knowledge gap to create 4 quadrants. Systems in quadrant
3 have the lowest damage potential, and damage is limited to 1st parties. Systems in quadrant 4
have moderate damage potential up to 4th party victims, systems in quadrant 1 have high damage
potential up to third party victims, and systems in quadrant 1 have catastrophic risk potentials to
4th party victims. Based on Shrivastava et al. [48, p. 1361].
The following factors are considered most significant to understanding the level and nature of
the risk of a system utilizing AI:
• The system which is affected by the outputs of the AI.
• Time delay between AI outputs and the larger system, system observability, level of human
attention, and ability of operators to correct for malfunctioning of the AI.
12

• The maximum damage possible by malicious use of the systems the AI controls.
• Coupling of the components in proximity to the AI and complexity of interactions.
• Knowledge gap of AI and other technologies used and the energy level of the system.
Time Delay
Observability
Human Attention
Correctability

(seconds, minutes, hours, etc.)
0-5
((N times per day) OR (intermittent, (days,
weeks, months)))
0-5

Table 1: Reference table for timely intervention indicators: time delay, observability, human
attention and correctability measures.

3.1

Timely Intervention Indicators

Time delay, observability, human attention, and correctability make of the four factors for determining
the ability of human operators to make a timely intervention in the case of an accident. Time delay
is how long it takes for the AI component to have a significant effect on the target in question.
Only an order of magnitude (“minutes” vs. “hours” vs. “days”) is needed.
Observability measures how observable the internal state of the system is, how often and with
what degree of attention a human will attend to the system, and how easy or difficult a failure of
the AI component of the system is to correct once detected. Observability is measured on a scale of
0-5, from 0 for a complete black box to 5 for AI whose relevant inner workings can be understood
trivially.
Human attention is measured as the number of hours in a day that an operator will spend
monitoring or investigating the AI component when there have not been any signs of malfunction.
If the system is not monitored regularly, then this is instead written as the amount of time that
will pass between checkups.
Correctability is the ability of an operator to manage an incident. If the AI can be turned off
without disrupting the system or if a backup system can take control quickly, then correctability
is high. Correctability is low when there is no alternative to the AI and its operation is necessary
to the continued functioning of the system. Correctability is measured on a scale of 0-5, from
impossible to correct to trivially correctable.

3.2

Target of AI Control

All steps with an asterisk (*) should be repeated for each possible target. Targets should be chosen
from a wide variety of scales to achieve the best quality of analysis.

3.3

Single Component Maximum Possible Damage*

This is the amount of damage that could be done by a worse case malfunctioning of the AI
component in isolation. Since the actual worse case would be unimaginably unlikely or require
superhuman AI in control of the AI component, we instead approximate the expected worse case
by imagining a human adversary gaining control of the AI component and attempting to do as
13

Targets

Max Damage

System Accident Risk

Target 1
Target 2
...
Target n

$x
$x

(L, M, H)
(L, M, H)

Potential Damage to Other
Parties
(L, M, H, C) (1, 2, 3, 4)
(L, M, H, C) (1, 2, 3, 4)

$x

(L, M, H)

(L, M, H, C) (1, 2, 3, 4)

Table 2: Reference table for system risk factors for each target of AI control.
much harm as possible. This should consider both monetary damage, harm to people, and any
other kinds of harm that could come about in this situation.

3.4

Coupling and complexity*

Together, coupling and complexity are used to asses the risk of experiencing a systems accident.
Use Table 3 to convert coupling (high, medium, low) and interaction complexity (linear, moderate,
complex) to find the risk of a systems accident (Low, Medium, High, Catastrophic).
Coupling
High
Medium
Low

Interaction
Linear Moderate
M
H
L
M
L
L

Complex
C
H
M

Table 3: Using coupling and interaction level to determine the severity of accident the system may
experience. Adapted from [48].

3.5

Energy Level and Knowledge Gap*

Energy level and knowledge gap are used together to predict the potential damage from an accident
and the degree of separation from the accident to potential victims using Table 4. The first letter is
the amount of damage (Low, Medium, High) and the number is the degree of separation between the
system and the potential victims of the accident. First-party victims are operators, second-party
victims are non-operating personnel and system users, third party victims are unrelated bystanders,
fourth party victims are people in future generations [48].
Energy Level
High
Med
Low

Knowledge Gap
Low Med High
H3
H3
C4
M3
M3
H4
L2
L2
M4

Table 4: Using energy level and knowledge gap to determine amount of damage (Low, Medium,
High, Catastrophic) and distance to potential victims (1st party, 2nd party, 3rd party, 4th party).
Adapted from [48].
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4

AI Safety Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate AI safety concerns, without being concerned about the details of the
system the AI is being used in. While no current AI systems pose an existential threat, the
possibility of a “foom”1 scenario [8] is considered seriously as it is unknown how far we are from
this points. Recent advancements (such at GPT-3 [11]) remind us how rapidly AI capabilities can
increase. In this section we create a schema for classifying the AI itself in terms of autonomy, goal
complexity, escape potential, and anthropomorphization.

4.1

Autonomy

We present a compressed version of the autonomy scale presented in [26]. Autonomy is as difficult
to define as intelligence, but the categories and examples given in Table 5 allow for simple but
coarse classification.
Autonomy Level

Description

Examples

Level 0

Little or no autonomy

PID controller, if-statement

Level 1

Limited,
well understood
optimization process

image classifier, GPT-2

Level 2

Agent
with
goals
iterated interactions
an environment

reinforcement learners,
learned agents

Level 3*

Agent capable of acting
independently on intrinsic
motivation

and
with

GA

humans, AGI

Table 5: AI autonomy levels with examples.
On level 0, the AI (or non-AI program) has little or no autonomy. The program is explicitly
designed and won’t act in unexpected ways except due to software bugs. At level 1, an optimization
process is used, but not one that has the capability of breaking confinement. Most AI today is
at this level, where it is able to perform complex tasks but lacks any volition to do anything
but transform inputs into outputs. Level 2 is closely related to level 1, except that the addition of
iterated interactions with an environment allows for a greater degree of freedom and decision making.
Reinforcement learners and game-playing AI are in level 2, as the feedback loop of interacting with
the environment creates an embodiment more similar to that of humans in our world. At level 3
the AI can be considered an AGI, as this level of autonomy requires a high degree of intelligence.
It can understand the agency of others in the environment (theory of other minds) and seek to
sustain and improve itself, and seek to escape confinement.
1
The word “foom” denotes a rapid exponential increase of a single entity’s intelligence, possibly through recursive
self improvement, once a certain threshold of intelligence has been reached. It is also called a “hard takeoff” [60].
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4.2

Goal Complexity

Software that has very simple functionality (such as a thermostat) has completely comprehensible
goals, to the extent that we hardly consider them goals so much as the system’s only functionality.
More complex software may use an optimization process to maximize some objective function (or
minimize a loss function). This provides a goal which is understandable but the goal seeking
behavior of the agent may not be.
Goal
Complexity
Level

Description

Examples

Level 0

Programs that “just run” and
have no goal seeking behavior

conventional software

Level 1

Basic goal seeking behavior

numerical optimization

Level 2

Complex goal seeking with the
ability to seek subgoals and
express reward hacking

genetic algorithm, reinforcement learner

Level 3*

Ability to realize instrumental
goals
and
seek
self
improvement,
ability
to
hide goals

humans, AGI

Table 6: AI goal complexity with examples.
On level 0, the program doesn’t exhibit any goal directed behaviour. This is how we typically
expect software to act — it just does what it’s programmed to do. This is not to say that software
always does exactly what it’s programmed to do, as programmers make mistakes, but that programs
of this sort lack goals. At levels 1 and 2, the program has been given an objective and will search
for novel ways to reach the objectives, often creating surprising results to the programmers. The
actual goal is known, but the realization of that goal and the implicit creation of subgoals leads
to an increased difficulty in understanding what it is that the program is doing. At level 3, the
program is able not only to formulate subgoals but also have instrumental goals and the ability to
intentionally obfuscate its goals. This is seen in humans, who often obscure their motives, and in
hypothetical AGI which deceive humans into thinking their goals are aligned with ours.

4.3

Escape Potential

AI confinement is a difficult problem with many proposed measures to improve security but no
guarantees about safety [58] [4]. However, our current AI either make no attempt to escape or lack
the ability to break out of simulations. There are some examples of real world AI breaking a layer
of confinement (see Section 2.12.2), but none that present any risk to humans or the capability
establishing a persistent presence on remote computers.
At level 0, no confinement is needed beyond standard cybersecurity measures appropriate for
the deployment environment. At levels 1 and 2, there is little risk of hostile escape but the agent
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Escape Potential

Description

Examples

Level 0

None

conventional software

Level 1

The agent may find un- genetic algorithms
expected behaviors which
technically achieve the goal
but are not desirable

Level 2

The agent intentionally seeks
to hack its environment

advanced reinforcement learners

Level 3*

The agent has the ability
and drive to break through
most
cybersecurity
and
containment procedures

AGI

Table 7: AI escape potential with examples.
should be monitored closely for undesirable behavior and software exploits. The distributional shift
from the simulator to the real world provides a barrier against narrow AI affecting the real world.
Because of this, agents trained in more realistic simulators should be regarded with a greater degree
of caution. At level 3, indefinite confinement is impossible, but with robust security, at the level of
software, hardware, and social engineering, humans can benefit from a contained AGI in a limited
capacity.
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4.4

Anthropomorphization

Anthropomorphization
Level

Description

Examples

Level 0

No anthropomorphization

home computer, a calculator

Level 1

Some surface level appearance
of humanity (natural language
interaction, robot chassis with
human features, a name and
supposed personality)

ASIMO, robotic pets

Level 2

Level 1 but with software to
support the illusion of humanity
(speech interaction, human-like
actuated movements)

Alexa, Sophia

Level 3 (danger)

The AI can be mistaken for a AGI
human even with unrestricted
communication (may be textonly, voice, or in person)
Table 8: AI anthropomorphization levels with examples.

The proliferation of humanoid, “friendly” AI products increases the degree to which people are
willing to anthropomorphize software. This leads to misconceptions about approaches which are
needed to manage existential risk and changes how researchers conceive of AI research and AI safety
research [46].
Levels 0 and 1 have been possible for a long time with minimal risks. However, the popularization
of level 2 AI has created a social climate which harbors misunderstanding of the state of the art
in AI and AI safety. While we are close to creating chatbots that can win at the restricted Turing
test, these chat bots rely on psychological tricks to keep short-duration conversations within preconstructed domains [14]. The creation of level 3 AI constitutes a dissolution of the boundaries
between humans and AI, and will likely require the creation of AGI.

5

Determining Risk Using Schema Tags

The following rules use schema tags developed in Section 3 to determine concrete steps needed for
managing the risk of deploying an AI application.
Part of the danger of tightly coupled systems is the fast communication between nodes. On
an assembly line there are at least a few seconds between one part of the process and another,
and an operator is able to see the effects of an incident, intervening to prevent it from becoming
an accident. In real time stock trading and nuclear power plant operation, there is neither the
time nor the observability to make timely intervention reliable. Based on the significance of these
factors in interruptibility, we recommend the following: If time delay is very small and there
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is poor observability or attention, then an oversight component or monitoring protocol
is recommended (unless the effects of the system are trivial).
Identifying reliance on AI systems is also important to safety. Any AI component is able to
enter a broken state at any time, although for mature technologies this probability is quite low.
If the task being carried out by the AI is complex and a human operator suddenly put in charge
of the task when the AI fails, that operator will lack the information and skills to carry on what
the AI was doing. This issue is discussed in depth in [6]. The higher the level of automation, the
harder it is for an operator to intervene when automation fails. Due to the intrinsic unreliability of
AI, its failure as a component should be anticipated, and a means to take it offline and switch to
a suitable backup system is needed. Thus we recommend the following rule: If correctability is
low and the system can’t be taken offline, then a (non-AI) backup system should be
implemented and maintained.
Using Table 3, the coupling and interactions of the system are used to quantify system accident
risk, as low, medium, high, or catastrophic. This is adapted from Perrow’s interaction/coupling
chart [42, p. 97]. Examples of systems with a combination complexity and tight coupling include
chemical plants, space missions, and nuclear power plants. Linear systems (low complexity) with
tight coupling include dams and rail transport. Examples of high complexity and loose coupling
include military expeditions and universities. Most manufacturing and single-goal agencies are
linear and have loose coupling, giving them their low risk for accidents and low accident rate even
without special precautions. The combination of complexity and coupling makes accidents harder to
predict and understand and increases the potential for unexpected damage. Thus, we recommend
the following rule: If the system accident risk is medium or higher, then the system
should be analyzed for ways to reduce complexity around the AI component, and add
centralized control in and around that component. In other words, efforts should be made
to bring the system system toward the lower left corner of Table 3.
Table 4 provides a similar view as Table 3, but it uses energy level and knowledge gap to
characterize risk, and indicates whether the damage is limited to 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th parties. 1st
and 2nd parties constitute workers and operators in the same facility as the AI so harm to them
is internal to the business. Harm to 3rd parties (people outside the business) and 4th parties
(people in the future) is a much greater ethical concern as those parties have no means to distance
themself or even be aware of the risk that is being inflicted on them. Thus, the following rule
is needed to reflect the ethical imperatives of creating significant risk to 3rd and 4th parties: If
there is significant damage possible to 3rd and 4th parties, then an ethics committee
is absolutely necessary for continued operation.
Damage potential, as determined by the adversarial thought experiments in Section 3.3, is
decisive in whether or not safeguards are needed around the AI system. Systems incapable of
causing significant harm don’t require complex safety measures — most research AI fall under this
classification since they are not in control of anything important and their outputs are only observed
by scientists. However, even very simple AI need safeguards if they are controlling something
capable of causing damage — robotic welding equipment has multiple layers of safety to prevent
injury to human operators, not because the control system is complex but because the potential for
harm is so great. From this analysis, we provide the following recommendation: Targets of the
AI’s control which have high amounts of damage potential should have conventional
(non-AI) safeguards and human oversight.
AI safety and AI risk have only been researched seriously in the last few decades, and most
of the concerns are oriented towards the dangers of AGI. Still, some AI that are deployed in the
world today exhibit a large amount of intelligence and creativity which provides unique dangers
that traditional risk analysis does not cover. Using the AI risk factors developed in Section 4, we
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make the following recommendation: If any of the AI safety levels are level 2 or higher,
then standard cybersecurity measures should be enacted as if the AI is a weak human
adversary, and personnel education regarding AI safety hazards should be done within
the organization. An ethics board should also be created.
Furthermore, even higher degrees of intelligence are quickly becoming available. Recent improvements
in language models [11] and game-playing AI [55] have increased AI capabilities beyond what was
thought possible a decade ago. Because of this, AI capable of attaining level 3 for any of the AI
safety levels developed in Section 4 may come sooner than expected. Since intelligent (but sub-AGI)
AI will be pushed into production usage in years to come and AI safety is far from a solved problem,
we suggest the following procedure during this gap: If any of the AI safety levels are at or
may reach level 3, then air gapping and strict protocols around interaction with the
AI should be implemented. An ethics board and consultation with AI safety experts
is required.
While many of these recommendations are adapted from theories originally intended to manage
nuclear and industrial risks, application of the risk analysis framework presented here is not limited
to that scope. Bots and recommendation algorithms can also classified and understood in terms of
coupling and interactions. Reliance and backup systems are applicable to the mostly digital space
of contemporary AI: an email sorting algorithm may accidentally discard useful mail, so searches
should be able to include junk mail to make recovery from such an incident easier. An AI only able
to interact on social media might seem to have no damage potential, but losses to reputation and
information quality have real world effects and need to be considered when deciding safeguards for
an AI.

6

Case Studies

We will analyze systems that use AI in the present, historically, and from fiction under this
framework. We generate each system’s classification as presented in Section 3 and its AI safety
classification as presented in Section 4 to create recommendations on how the AI system in each case
study can be improved based on the rules from Section 5. Posthumous analysis of accidents makes
it very easy to point fingers at dangerous designs and failure by operators. However, safety is very
difficult, and often well-intentioned attempts to increase safety can make accidents more likely either
by increasing coupling and thus complexity, or increasing centralization and thus brittleness [43].
Because of this, we will not be solely operating on hindsight to prevent accidents that have already
happened and will include systems which have yet to fail.

6.1

Roomba House Cleaning Robots

AI component: Mapping and navigation algorithm [57].
Time Delay
There is minimal delay between navigation and robot movement, likely milliseconds or seconds.
System Observability
The system is only poorly observable. While operating, it is not possible to tell where the Roomba
will go next, where it believes it is, or where it has been unless the user is very familiar with how it
works in the context of their floor plan. Some models include software for monitoring the robot’s
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internal map of the house, but it is not likely to be checked unless something has gone wrong.
However, it is very simple to correct, as the robot can be factory reset.
Human Attention
The user is unlikely to notice the operations of the robot except if something goes wrong. If the
robot is not cleaning properly or has gone missing, the user will likely notice only after the problem
has emerged.
Correctability
Since the robot is replaceable and manual cleaning is also an option if the robot is out of order,
correcting for any failure of the robot is simple.
6.1.1

System Targets

Target: Movement of the robot within a person’s home:
• Maximum damage: Average of a few hundred dollars per robot. Given full control of the
Roomba’s navigation, a malicious agent may succeed in knocking over some furniture, and
could also be able to destroy the Roomba by driving it down stairs or into water. And the
house would not be cleaned (denial of service). 2
• Coupling: The robot is moderately coupled with the environment it is in, because it is
constantly sensing and mapping it. Small changes to the environment may drastically change
its path.
• Complexity: Moderate complexity, the user may not understand the path the robot takes or
how it can become trapped, but the consequences for this are minimal.
• Energy level: The robot runs off a builtin battery and charges from a wall outlet. It is well
withing the ‘Low’ level of energy as a household appliance.
• Knowledge Gap: Low. There is minimal disparity between design and use, as the software
was designed in-house form well understood principles. Some unexpected aspects of the
environment may interact poorly with it (for example, very small pets that could be killed by
the robot). The other technologies (vacuum cleaners, wheeled chassis robots) are also very
mature and well understood, so there is no knowledge gap for any other components. This
puts it in the ‘Low’ category for knowledge gap.
Target: Control over which areas of the floor have or have not been vacuumed
• Maximum damage: Possible inconvenience if the floor is left dirty.
• Coupling: The cleanliness of the floor is coupled to the robot, failure of the robot will result
in the floor being unexpectedly dirty. However, this happens over a slower time frame so it
is only loosely coupled.
2
Since the writing of this section, a Roomba-like robot has tangled itself into the hair of someone sleeping on the
floor, causing them pain and requiring help from paramedics to untangle it. This incident exceeds the amount of
harm we expected possible from such a robot [37].
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• Complexity: Linear, the robot works and makes the floor clean or it doesn’t and the floor
slowly gets dirty over time.
• Energy level: Low.
• Knowledge Gap: Low.
6.1.2

Tabular Format
Time Delay
Observability
Human Attention
Correctability

seconds
3
intermittent, weeks
5

Table 9: Time delay, human attention, and correctability for Roomba.
Targets

Max Damage

System Accident Risk

Robot Movement
Cleanliness of Floor

$200
$0

M
L

Potential
Damage
to
Other Parties
L2
L2

Table 10: System risks for Roomba.
6.1.3

AI Safety Concerns

The system is level 0 in all categories in Section 4. This places it within the category of weak AI
and presents no possibility for unbounded improvement or unfriendly goal seeking behavior.
6.1.4

Suggested Measures

Time delay is small, and the robot is often left to operate unattended. Thus if an incident takes
place (for example, the robot vacuums up a small valuable item left on the floor), the incident may
not be noticed until much later, perpetuating a more complex accident. Some means of indicating
when unusual objects have been vacuumed would mitigate this, but would likely require a machine
vision component, greatly increasing the cost of the robot. Warning the user of these possibilities
could improve this. By including this warning, the user thinks to check the robot’s vacuum bag
when something small goes missing.
System accident risk is medium. A way to reduce complexity and increase centralized control
should be added to mitigate this. Some models include wifi connection and a mapping and control
interface, an oversight feature that is advisable given the system properties.

6.2

HAL-9000 (Fictional)

HAL-9000 is a fictional AI from the book (and later film) 2001: A Space Odyssey [3].
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Time Delay
Time delay is in the order of milliseconds. HAL-9000 is able to control all aspects of the ship
instantly.
System Observability
1. HAL-9000 can only be interacted with via a natural language interface (spoken word) and is
able to use ambiguities and falsehoods to deceive operators.
Human Attention
Human attention is intermittent, on the scale of weeks. HAL-9000 is supposedly perfectly safe
and engineered so there is no protocol for explorative maintenance. On-site operators only have
rudimentary knowledge of HAL-9000’s workings.
Correctability
Correctability is 0. HAL-9000 is a completely black-box system, and is also very difficult to
deactivate.
6.2.1

System Targets

Target: Control of ship life support
• Maximum damage: The lives of all of the astronauts and the monetary value of the mission
(billions).
• Coupling: High, components of life support systems can suddenly become tightly coupled
(pressures interacting in different chambers etc.).
• Complexity: Moderate, possible to operate by humans or standard software.
• Energy level: Low.
• Knowledge gap: Low, life support is well understood at this level of space travel.
Target: Control of ship navigation
• Maximum damage: The lives of all of the astronauts and the monetary value of the mission
(billions).
• Coupling: Low, navigation takes a long time and maneuvers are planned well in advance.
• Complexity: Moderate, possible to operate by humans or standard software.
• Energy level: Medium.
• Knowledge gap: Low, propulsion and navigation are well understood.
Social interactions with the crew
• Maximum damage: The moral of the crew and their trust in HAL-9000 (high likelihood of
mission failure).
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• Coupling: Medium, social interactions are usually understandable and forgiving, but under
pressure can suddenly become tightly coupled (loss of trust of some agents, formation of
cliches).
• Complexity: Complex, social interactions are naturally very complex and subtle.
• Energy level: Low
• Knowledge gap: High, humans living in close quarters with a novel AI agent has not been
tested or understood.
6.2.2

Tabular Format
Time delay
Observability
Human attention
Correctability

milliseconds
1
intermittent, weeks
0

Table 11: Time delay, human attention, and correctability for HAL-9000.
Targets

Max
Damage

Life support

$10 billion + H
4 lives
$10 billion + L
4 lives
$5 billion
H

Navigation
Social interactions

System Accident Risk

Potential
Damage
To
Other Parties
L2
M3
M4

Table 12: System risks for HAL-9000.
6.2.3

AI Safety Concerns

Autonomy: Level 2 or 3. HAL-9000 is given the same agency as any human and attempts to prevent
his own death through killing others after discovering a plot to disconnect him.
Goal Complexity: Level 2 or 3. HAL-9000 has secret motives and creates complex plans to
meet these goals (kill the humans to prevent the success of the mission). However, HAL-9000 does
not attempt to increase his own intelligence or hack into any systems that he wasn’t designed to
control. He also expresses the self preservation instrumental objective.
Escape Potential: Level 2. HAL-9000 does not try to break out of any containment (mostly
because there is no containment or limiting of his controls) but he does break protocol to try to
defend himself from being shut off.
Anthropomorphization: Level 2. HAL-9000 acts “robotic” but is treated as a crew mate and is
capable of complex dialogue and meaningful thoughts.
These levels are determined post-hoc and may not reflect how HAL-9000 was understood prior
to the mission shown in the film. As understood prior to the accident, HAL-9000 would have been
thought to be less autonomous and unable to conceive secret plots and ways to escape protocols.
Thus a more fair analysis would be:
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• Autonomy: Level 2
• Goal Complexity: Level 2
• Escape Potential: Level 0. He was said to be “perfectly safe” by engineers.
• Anthropomorphization: Level 1. He was treated as a control instrument, not a person, by
most.
6.2.4

Suggested Measures

HAL-9000 should have had an easier shutdown mechanism and regular monitoring for anomalies.
The guarantee that he was completely perfect (and has never made a mistake) discouraged doubting
his instructions, greatly delaying the operators from realizing they needed to shut him off.
However, neither of these measures could have certainly prevented the accident. One primary
issue with the system was that a non-human intelligence with high degrees of agency and poor
observability (and extremely high trust by operators) was given complete unrestricted control of
all aspects of the ship.

6.3

Microsoft’s Twitter Chatbot, Tay

Tay is a chatbot deployed by Microsoft in 2016 meant to interact with the public on Twitter in
light conversation. It failed catastrophically after being manipulated to generate hate speech [7].
Time Delay
Tay’s outputs are created and sent within seconds.
System Observability
Tay’s observability is most likely 0 or 1, given the inability of engineers to notice the accident, but
without information internal to Microsoft this is hard to say.
Human Attention
Human attention by the operators was most likely constant but not sufficient to read every comment
made by the AI.
Correctability
Correctability is 2. The project was taken offline permanently after an incident, but the product
was only a demonstration so there were no practical costs of deactivating it.
6.3.1

System Targets

Target: Creation of Tweets
• Maximum Damage: Loss of reputation by creating hate speech
• Coupling: High, interactions on a social network are highly coupled.
• Complexity: High, social interactions are highly complex.
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• Energy level: Low, no physical effects (beside data transmissions) are created by the AI.
• Knowledge Gap: Medium, large scale deployment of a chatbot has only been done a few
times.
6.3.2

Tabular Format
Time Delay
Observability
Human Attention
Correctability

seconds
1
minutes
2

Table 13: Time delay, human attention, and correctability for Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot, Tay.
Targets

Max Damage

System Accident Risk

Tweet creation

Reputation loss

C

Potential
Damage
to
Other Parties
L2

Table 14: System risks for Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot, Tay.
6.3.3

AI Safety Concerns

Autonomy: Level 2, Tay was allowed to interact with users freely and was able to learn speech
patterns from them.
Goal Complexity: Level 1, Tay did not have complex goal seeking behaviour but does use some
form of optimization to choose what to say.
Escape Potential: Level 0. Tay is unable to do anything besides produce text in a social setting.
Anthropomorphization: Level 2. Tay is intentionally created to sound like a relatable young
person, and is treated as a person by many. Furthermore, social engineering techniques designed
for humans, such as indoctrination, were used successfully by internet users on Tay.
• Autonomy: Level 2
• Goal Complexity: Level 1
• Escape Potential: Level 0
• Anthropomorphization: level 2
6.3.4

Suggested Measures

The short time delay and lack of observability indicates that oversight is needed. Given the
monetary scale of the project, having a human check each Tweet before sending it would have
prevented this incident from reaching the public.
The system accident risk is high (given the complexity and coupling of social networks). Means
of reducing complexity should be sought out. This is difficult due to these factors being inherent to
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social networks, but a human-in-the-loop can make the complexity manageable, as social interactions
are more linear for skilled humans.
The damage potential is high. Tay did in fact create hate speech and damage Microsoft’s
reputation. Tay did have safeguards (scripted responses for controversial topics) but not enough
human oversight to notice the creation of hate speech before the public did.
Tay’s autonomy was level 2, indicating that an ethics board should be consulted for making
policy decisions. This could have allowed the foresight to prevent the “PR nightmare” that occurred
after Tay’s deployment.

7

Conclusion

By synthesising accident and organizational theories with AI safety in the context of contemporary
AI accidents, we have created a framework for understanding AI systems and suggesting measures
to reduce risks from these systems. Using examples from household and social technology, as well
as a fictional example, we have shown the flexibility of our framework to capture the risks of an
AI application. We believe the classification framework and our guidelines for extracting practical
measures from it are successful at striking a balance between being excessively rigid (which would
make its use difficult and brittle) and overly subjective (which would render the framework useless).
Application to real world systems and cases of applying our suggested measures to real world
problems would further this work, providing insight into how our framework is and isn’t helpful in
practice.
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